

[1].’ Such systems have been in existence for decades and have a wide range of functions, including (amongst others) providing alerts or reminders, identifying drug-drug interactions, highlighting specific guidelines at the point of care, and providing suggested courses of action to clinicians [2]. More advanced forms of these tools are increasingly driven by sophisticated artificial intelligence (AI) or machine learning (ML). Some examples are Google’s DeepMind [3], IBM’s Watson [4] and the Dutch system Oncoguide [5]. In this paper we focus especially on these advanced forms of DSS; systems which utilize artificial intelligence and machine learning based on retrospective diagnostic and therapeutic data from real patients. These new systems raise specific challenges, for which the current legal framework may not be adequately prepared.

As with all new technologies in medicine, DSS create a tension between the potential benefits, such as improved individual treatment, and the potential risks involved. Risks include errors in the use (or misuse) of the system, errors of analysis within the system, failures to secure confidentiality of information, or, breaches of patient privacy. In the case of genetic information, not only patients but also their relatives could be harmed. The overarching danger is of a loss of patient trust in the health care system if DSS errors occur. There are also wider concerns about the application of these tools that require careful consideration. For example, the users of DSS could regard the result from the computerised system as somehow ‘more valid, accurate or reliable than human output’ [6]. This could intervene with a process of shared decision-making, and carefully weighing and discussing test results and medical decisions in multidisciplinary teams or with other specialists in the field. Moreover, it is certainly not unimaginable that patients or insurance companies demand the use of DSS to challenge clinical decisions, particularly if a DSS is perceived to favour or restrict treatment by comparison with the opinion of the treating physician. Such a development could put pressure on the fiduciary relationship between healthcare professionals and their patients.

We would like to stress that such risks are not new to medicine: digital decision support tools of various sorts have been used for many years (even Medline and similar healthcare literature databases are digital tools that are used for clinical decision making). However, the legal environment for medical databases is relatively simple, compared to that of providing medical care to patients; Whereas software and computer systems are usually regulated as products or devices in a limited manner [7], clinical DSS are situated in a much more rigorous regulatory context [8]. This means that the application of advanced DSS in healthcare will require compliance with a complex web of existing laws and

regulations that will vary between countries, jurisdictions and regions (such as the European Union). The aim of this article is to identify and discuss some of the key legal issues related to the use of artificial-intelligence based DSS in Europe, to prevent legal problems occurring when these systems are implemented in clinical practice.

2. An overview of potential legal issues

2.1. Compliance with standard of care

A first key challenge for the implementation of DSS is how this will comply with the professional standards that apply to the care providers who will use them. In most legal systems, the required standard is that of a reasonable and careful professional or healthcare provider. For example, according to Dutch law, when providing medical care, the doctor should act in conformity with the standards of a ‘good health care provider’, which means that he must observe the responsibilities laid upon him by the standards for (his category of) medical professionals [9]. The professional standard consists of relevant legislation, codes of conduct and other forms of self-regulation, possibly explained by jurisprudence. Similarly, in common law countries, such as the UK, the standard required of medical professionals is that of a reasonable degree of skill and care according to the standards of the profession [10]. On a European level, the explanatory report of the Council of Europe’s Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine (hereafter: Biomedicine Convention) [11] of 1997 mentions that the standard of care may vary slightly from one society to another; ‘However, the fundamental principles of the practice of medicine apply in all countries. Doctors and, in general, all professionals who participate in a medical act (...) (...) must act with care and competence, and pay careful attention to the needs of each patient.’ In all jurisdictions, guidelines, practice directions and practical guidance issued by professional bodies are very important in establishing a reasonable standard of care.

In the case of advanced DSS, which are – at least in several European countries – not yet even in their ‘research phase’, specific codes of conduct for practitioners are yet to be developed. Translational research on the efficacy, safety and risks of using DSS is necessary (although not sufficient in itself) to establish professional norms. One of the major questions of such research should be whether, and, in what way, DSS should be used in the different sectors of medical care? Perhaps the most likely, and moderate approach would be to use DSS as a ‘second opinion’ tool to facilitate medical teams that need to take very

complex decisions about patients. For the complex decisions involved in personalized medicine, the outcome of DSS could be a welcome extra piece of information. A more extreme approach would be to use DSS as a decisive tool for diagnosing diseases and developing treatments for individual patients that largely replace the individual decisions of the treating physician. Such use of DSS would challenge existing legal norms, for example that the main treating physician carries a final responsibility for medical decisions towards his/her patients, and rules about automated decision-making under the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [12]. Article 22 of the GDPR provides individuals with the right not to be the subject of a decision based solely on automated processing which significantly affects him or her. This has the effect of a general prohibition on fully automated decision-making (with no human involvement) [13], although there is room in the regulation for lawful automated decision making, provided there has been explicit consent and there are suitable safeguards in place to allow the individual to express an opinion, contest a decision or obtain human intervention [14]. Translational research using DSS will need to meet ethical and legal requirements applying to research, as incorporated in the Declaration of Helsinki, and the European and national laws on human subject research. Important elements in this respect are written informed consent of research subjects, an approval of the research protocol from a review board or ethics committee and clear policies about what is done with the results of DSS. This raises some questions that require careful consideration, such as: what will be done with the research results? Will they be discussed with the research participants? Are participants put at risk in a trial of DSS? How will privacy be secured and personal data protected?

2.2. *Malfunctioning of the system*

As Belard and colleagues identified, developers have been predominantly concerned with the efficacy of systems rather than with their safety, however, the application of health information technology has not been without malfunctions with the potential for human harm [15]. Monitoring by the United States Food and Drug Administration (which regulates medical devices) revealed four major categories of adverse events; ‘errors of commission, defined as accessing the wrong patient record or overwriting information (...) errors of omission, defined as loss or corruption of vital patient data (...) errors in the data analysis (...) incompatibility between multi-vendor application and systems...’[16] Some of these errors may appear basic, but they are no less relevant in relation to DSS. There is the

potential for inputting inadequate or incomplete patient information in the system, a flawed analysis by software, or, failures based on incompatibility with patient record systems. In particular, it will be very difficult to determine whether algorithms used for the functioning of a DSS meet with the applicable professional standard of care within the country in which the system is used. Determining this will require that either the care providers are highly knowledgeable and able to critique the algorithms themselves, or, that the developer and/or supplying company of a DSS (hereafter we use the term ‘DSS supplier’) can prove that the system is adequate in light of current professional standards. In other words: who carries (the main) responsibility for problems caused by DSS in the course of regular medical treatment? It would make sense that the DSS supplier should be held responsible for technical and safety defects as they are the designers and developers of these tools [17].

In many countries, there has been significant debate whether software should be treated as a service or a product in law.[18] Now, the EU Medical Devices Regulation of 2017 [19] (which came into force 26th May 2017) [20] makes clear that software intended to provide information which is used to take decisions with diagnosis or therapeutic purposes, is classified as a medical device [21]. DSS manufacturers will need to comply with many requirements, including that they have measures in place to provide financial compensation for potential liability for defective devices [22]. The regulation provides for a proportionate scrutiny of safety and efficacy for devices depending on their purpose and potential consequences. The highest levels of scrutiny applying to devices which provide information that is used to take decisions which could cause a serious deterioration in health, or even death [23]. For such DSS, safety will be assessed with a clinical evaluation prior to their entry into use and there is scope for clinical investigations of the device—essentially a form of research—to establish their safety and efficacy [24]. This should reduce the potential for errors in the use of DSS and places clear responsibility on manufacturers to ensure safety and efficacy, but it cannot prevent all potential errors in the future, in particular errors in misuse of DSS by HCPs or misinterpretation of results. Pre-emptive clinical assessment also does not account for any changes that may occur in the algorithms and the potential for errors based on that.

A few final words about product liability. If we see DSS as a product, according to some legal systems (for example, UK law) liability will not require negligence but is instead based on ‘strict’ liability for defects. The DSS supplier may be liable even if they took reasonable care to avoid a defect or if they complied

with professional standards [25]. This means a patient could recover damages if a DSS mistakenly suggested a course of action that lead to avoidable harm. The role of health care providers in this context is not likely to alter legal liability of DSS-suppliers because it would be foreseeable that health care providers would rely on the results of the analysis [26]. Inappropriate use of DSS (or misinterpretation of results) would be a different matter, for which healthcare providers could be responsible and liable too. Because the answers to these liability issues are complex and differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, we leave this issue to be further explored. We want to stress that it should be clear among all parties involved in DSS, where the responsibility of DSS-suppliers ends and where the responsibility of health care provider begins.

2.3. *Privacy, medical confidentiality and data protection*

DSS process individual patient information from sources such as electronic health records in order to generate individual diagnoses and results. One scenario is that this information is solely used for the patient's diagnosis or treatment and this implies that it will not be shared with others than the team of healthcare providers treating the patient. However, in some cases the DSS-suppliers might retain this information and use it for further purposes, for example to improve their system, to conduct research (in cooperation with health care institutions) or even for commercial purposes. The latter use is, at least in many parts of Europe, a controversial issue and some hospitals will not be prepared to cooperate with companies for which commercial use is non-negotiable. With regard to privacy, it is essential that DSS-suppliers ensure the same level of confidentiality and privacy protection as health care providers. All involved parties (not only the DSS-suppliers, but also all healthcare providers) should respect the rules of medical confidentiality and the principles governing the processing of health data [27]. A problem could be, however, that DSS-suppliers cannot ensure the same level of medical confidentiality as health care providers, for instance because patient data are held by them for purposes other than medical care, such as further improvement of their systems. In the latter situation, it is unclear whether (an employee of) a DSS-company could - on the basis of a physician's right to testimonial privilege - refuse to provide access to the public authorities who request for such data. Another issue could be that data processing in relation to DSS will often be an international matter; involving cloud services, databases or data processing systems held in a different country to the country in which the DSS is used. This could include, for instance, that the data of patients are stored in a database or cloud held within the territories

of the United States and are thereby secured by less protective privacy regulations. If are transferred from an EU Member State to a third country, the provisions of chapter V of the GDPR of the European Union should be observed [28]. We will go into more detail on the implications of the GDPR below.

If data are genuinely anonymous they may be used without consent. However, if a person can be identified even indirectly, for example by combining several sources of information, the data should be treated as identifiable [29], and legal obligations, such as obtaining consent, apply. As stated above, ensuring compliance with medical confidentiality and other privacy requirements becomes more challenging if data are used by DSS-providers for purposes other than patient care. If sensitive patient data are used within the healthcare institution to improve the operation of the system—which in turn should provide patient benefit—, or is shared with DSS-suppliers for purely technical operations with the data, this may be seen as analogous to auditing (monitoring and improvement) of the provided health care, and therefore the patient implicitly consented to this kind of use [30]. When data are used for purposes that go beyond quality assurance in a strict sense, such as scientific research, or when the DSS supplier use them for their own purposes, this may be an unlawful use of data without consent. A clear example of this is the case of the Royal Free London NHS Foundation Trust's agreement with Google DeepMind. It demonstrates that there is a dividing line between reasonable use of patient data for improvement in care, and, a legally unreasonable, unexpected or disproportionate use. In this case, the Royal Free shared the identifiable data of 1.6 million patients without their consent, with DeepMind in order to test the safety of their Streams app, which was being developed to alert clinicians to patients at risk of acute kidney injury. The UK Information Commissioner ruled that this agreement failed to comply with data protection laws and that the Royal Free had failed to demonstrate a satisfactory legal basis for the processing of the sensitive personal data [31]. Taking each of the principles of data protection under the European Data Protection Directive in turn [32], the Commissioner rejected that such a use of data could be lawfully based on the implied consent of 1.6 million patients and there was insufficient evidence to claim that the processing of data could be based on medical necessity. The Commissioner was not persuaded that it was necessary or proportionate to process this volume of data in order to test the clinical safety of the app. Furthermore, the Commissioner made clear that the lack of information and transparency towards patients would not allow them to prevent or opt-out of processing. Finally, the Royal Free had failed to implement a sufficiently detailed agreement with DeepMind to en-

sure that only the minimal possible data would be accessible to Deepmind and that processing would be conducted for limited means. Although the data protection principles in the GDPR remain largely the same as the principles in the former Data Protection Directive, the new regulation is stricter on some points. For instance, it requires data controllers to carry out an impact assessment prior to processing—in particular, processing using new technologies—if it is likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of individuals [33]. In general, patient consent will be required in order to use identifiable patient information for purposes other than care, safeguarding quality and safety of care (in a strict sense), and management of health services [34]. We discuss this ‘secondary use’ of data used, and generated, by DSS below. In some countries, such as the Netherlands, new laws on electronic data processing have been (or are being) introduced [35], requiring explicit consent the moment patient data are being exchanged between two or more individual health care institutions. The Dutch law does not apply to the exchange of patient data within one institution.

2.3.1. Secondary uses of patient data

When special categories of personal data such as data concerning health, are processed on the basis of informed consent, the GDPR requires that the data subject has given explicit consent to the processing for one or more specified purposes [36]. The regulation requires that consent is freely given, specific, informed and made with a clear and recorded affirmative act such as a written statement, electronic means or an oral statement [37]. The regulation specifically states that, when assessing whether consent is freely given, ‘utmost account shall be taken of whether, inter alia, the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is conditional on consent to the processing of personal data that is not necessary for the performance of that contract [38].’ This is a warning that consent forms that require agreement to unrelated secondary processing of personal information in order to benefit from DSS could, quite easily, be seen as coercive and unlawful.

One of the exceptions to this rule is when medical data are to be processed for scientific research. In the Regulation’s preamble, the drafters of the Regulation make clear that scientific research should be facilitated by allowing processing of personal data for such purposes under certain conditions and safeguards set out in Union or Member State law [39]. This exception requires Member States to develop national law to implement it, with specific conditions. Article 9(2)(j) of the GDPR is more specific about these conditions: the law should be proportionate

to the aim pursued; the essence of the right to data protection should be respected; and suitable and specific measures to safeguard the fundamental rights and the interests of the data subject, such as pseudonymisation and data minimisation [40], should be provided. In the Netherlands, the Medical Treatment Agreement Act contains a few additional requirements, such as, if asking for consent is reasonably impossible or may not reasonably be required (because patients are deceased or untraceable, or the research involves enormous numbers of patients), then patients are offered an informed option to ‘opt-out’ from the use of their data. Additional requirements apply, such as that the research should serve a public interest.

2.3.2. International transfer of patient data

A further challenge may occur where a DSS requires the transfer of patient data outside the EU, for example, to cloud storage in the USA or elsewhere. Current EU law and the GDPR prohibit the transfer of personal data outside the EU unless the Commission has decided there is an adequate level of protection, or, where there are adequate safeguards and effective legal remedies for the enforcement of data subjects rights.[41] Transfers might be adequately safeguarded using standard contractual clauses approved by the Commission [42]. However, even a decision of adequacy by the Commission may be struck down, as occurred with the original EU-US Safe Harbor agreement which allowed US companies to self-certify that they would protect EU citizens data. A replacement, more robust, EU-US Privacy Shield agreement has been approved by the Commission but it is possible that this will face further legal challenge—particularly because it is still possible for US intelligence agencies to access EU-derived data [43].

In absence of an adequacy decision or appropriate safeguards, a transfer to a third country could take place if the data subjects have ‘(...) explicitly consented to the proposed transfer, after having been informed of the possible risks of such transfers for the data subject due to the absence of an adequacy decision and appropriate safeguards’ [44]. One possible concern for implementation of DSS in the EU is that patients will be reluctant to consent to the transfer of their data outside the EU. It should be noted that patient consent will not be necessary if the data transfer is only for the purposes of providing health care in emergency situations in which the data subject is physically or legally incapable of giving consent [45]. The GDPR allows Member States some discretion to introduce further limitations on the transfer of health data to a third country (in the absence of an adequacy decision), for example to prevent transfers on the basis of consent [46].

3. Conclusions

The clinical application of increasingly sophisticated decision support systems such as Google's DeepMind, IBM's Watson and Oncoguide, presents a number legal challenges for both DSS-suppliers and healthcare providers. A first set of challenges relate to the professional standard of care and medical liability in case of errors or malfunctioning of systems, either on the part of the healthcare providers using and interpreting the results of the system, or the system itself. Determining a reasonable standard of care when using DSS will not be straightforward. Meeting these challenges therefore, requires preliminary testing and robust translational research. Such research should involve care providers, who need to establish reasonable standards for the use of DSS, and suppliers, who need to ensure they that comply with care standards and meet their obligations under the European Regulation on Medical Devices. Regarding liability, it is care providers who are directly liable to patients for failures in their care, but it will not be straightforward to determine whether they have used reasonable skill and care in their consultation and use of DSS. Although DSS suppliers have no direct relationship with patients, they are likely to be subject to liability for errors in the system that result in harm.

A second set of challenges will be meeting legal and ethical standards for protection of patient privacy, medical confidentiality and data protection. This should not be difficult if an individual's data are only shared with other professionals for the purpose of providing their care, the data are kept safely and securely, not stored or processed for other purposes and do not cross EU-borders. In this case, patient consent will not be strictly necessary [47]. There will be a greater challenge for healthcare providers and DSS-suppliers if patients' data are used for other purposes (such as research) or if data are processed outside the EU. A major issue will be whether, and if so, under what conditions, DSS-suppliers may use the generated data for their own (business) purposes. In all those situations, data controllers are advised to ensure that patients are well informed and are asked for their consent, especially if the use involves commercial purposes. If patient data are transferred outside the EU this may be to a country that the European Commission has determined offers adequate protection or based on safeguards such as model contractual clauses.

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Conflict of interest disclosure

We have no conflict of interest to declare.

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- [8] Goodman (n 6) 133.
- [9] See HR 9-11-1990, ECLI:NL:PHR:1990:AC1103 (Speeckaert/-Gradener).
- [10] The test in England and Wales is ‘the standard of the ordinary skilled man exercising and professing to have that special skill.’; *Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee* [1957] 2 All ER 118 at 121; [1957] 1 WLR 582 at 586.
- [11] The Biomedicine Convention is signed by all member states of the Council of Europe, but several European countries did not ratify, such as the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Belgium.
- [12] Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council (EU) 679/2016 of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L 119/1
- [13] Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Guidelines on Automated individual decision-making and Profiling for the purposes of Regulation 2016/679’ (European Commission, 13th Feb 2018)
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- [15] Belard A, Buchman T, Forsberg J, Potter BK, Dente CJ, Kirk A, et al. Precision diagnosis: a view of the clinical decision support systems (CDSS) landscape through the lens of critical care. *J Clin Monit Comput* 2017;31:261–71.
- [16] Belard (n 15) 267.

- [17] In this regard, an analogy may be made with the discussion of whether the developers and publishers of medical databases can be held liable for defects and inaccuracies in their database; see Adrian Thoroughgood, Robert Cook-Deegan Bartha Maria Knoppers, ‘Public variant databases: liability?’ (2017) 19 *Genetics in Medicine*, 838–841.
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- [19] Regulation (EU) 2017/745 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2017 on Medical Devices. OJ L 117/1 (5 May 2017).
- [20] However, the regulation includes important transitional provisions (see Article 120 of the Regulation). These include that ‘[f]rom 26 May 2020, any publication of a notification in respect of a notified body in accordance with Directives 90/385/EEC and 93/42/EEC shall become void’ and that ‘[c]ertificates issued by notified bodies in accordance with Directives 90/385/EEC and 93/42/EEC prior to 25 May 2017 shall remain valid until the end of the period indicated on the certificate, except for certificates issued in accordance with Annex 4 to Directive 90/385/EEC or Annex IV to Directive 93/42/EEC which shall become void at the latest on 27 May 2022’.
- [21] Art 51; Rule 11, Annex VIII Medical Devices Regulation.
- [22] Art 10 (16) Medical Devices Regulation.
- [23] Rule 11, Annex VIII Medical Devices Regulation.
- [24] Arts 61-62, Medical Devices Regulation.
- [25] Goertzel (n 18) 25.
- [26] This would not ‘break the chain of causation’, or, constitute a *novus actus interveniens*.
- [27] See for instance *Z v. FINLAND* - 22009/93 [1997] ECHR 10 (25 February 1997).
- [28] Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council (EU) 679/2016 of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L 119/1.
- [29] Recital 26 GDPR.
- [30] For example, the UK General Medical Council’s guidance on confidentiality emphasizes that this implied consent may be overridden by an express objection by a patient, and that patient’s should have ready access to information that explains their personal information may be disclosed for clinical audit: General Medical Council, ‘Confidentiality: good practice in handling patient information’ (GMC, Manchester 2017) paras 96-8.
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- [32] Directive 95/46/EC, as implemented in the UK in the Data Protection Act 1998.
- [33] Under Article 35, stipulating that, especially when it is likely that data processing results in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons (think of making use of new technologies and processing health data) ‘(...) the controller shall, prior to the processing, carry out an assessment of the impact of the envisaged processing operations on the protection of personal data. A single assessment may address a set of similar processing operations that present similar high risks.’
- [34] Art. 9 (2) (h) GDPR.
- [35] Law on client’s right to electronic data processing in health care (Wet cliëntenrechten bij elektronische verwerking van gegevens in de zorg) of October 5, 2016, *Staatsblad* 2016, 373. The law entered partly into force on July 1, 2017.
- [36] Art 9 (2) (a) GDPR.
- [37] Although, if the purpose of processing is scientific research, the preamble of the GDPR makes clear that if it is not possible ‘to fully identify the purpose of personal data processing (...) (...) data subjects should be allowed to give their consent to certain areas of scientific research when in keeping with recognised ethical standards for scientific research’. See recital 33 Preamble.
- [38] Art 7(4) GDPR.
- [39] See recital 157.
- [40] See Art 89 GDPR.
- [41] Arts 45-6 GDPR. See also recital 101 of its preamble: ‘(...) when personal data are transferred from the Union to controllers, processors or other recipients in third countries or to international organisations, the level of protection of natural persons ensured in the Union by this Regulation should not be undermined (...)’.
- [42] Art 46 (2) (c) (d).
- [43] Taylor Wessing LEXOLOGY, EC standard contractual clauses for US data transfers to be scrutinised by the CJEU (Oct 19 2017) <<https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=4b54daee-cae5-45eb-9ee0-bfdf85a804e0>>
- [44] Art 49 (1) (a) GDPR.
- [45] Art 49 (1) (f) GDPR.
- [46] Arts 9 (4) & 49 (5) GDPR.
- [47] However, according to-for instance-a recent Dutch law on patients’ rights regarding electronic data processing, explicit consent is required if patient data are exchanged between health care providers working in different institutions, even when this is solely for the purpose of medical care: : Law on Client Rights regarding Electronic Data Processing in Health Care [Wet cliëntenrechten bij elektronische verwerking van gegevens in de zorg], into force in 2017.